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Defendant/respondent Busch Development, Inc. (Busch),
by and through its undersigned counsel, submits the following
brief.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah, §78-2-2, Utah
Code Ann. (1953 as amended), and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The proceedings below consisted of Busch's motion for
summary judgment and the motion of plaintiff/appellant Timothy
R. Bosch (plaintiff) for partial summary judgment.

The lower

court granted Busch1s motion and denied plaintiff's motion.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1 . Was the trial court correct in ruling that since
Busch was plaintiff's "employer" as that term is defined in Utah
Code Ann., §35-1-42, Busch was entitled to the benefit of the
exclusive

remedy

provision

of Utah

Code

Ann. §35-1-60 and,

therefore, not subject to suit by plaintiff?
2.

Does Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 enable plaintiff to

maintain his action against Busch despite the exclusive remedy
provision of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60?
3.

Was the trial court correct in ruling that the

penalty provision of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-57 is not applicable
-1-

to Busch and does not enable plaintiff to sue Busch in circumvention of the exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Ann. §35—
1-60?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

1917, Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §50.

2.

1917, Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §52a.

3.

1917, Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §53.

4.

1917, Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §71.

5.

1917, Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §72.

6.

1919, Utah Laws, Ch. 63, §3110.

7.

Utah Code Ann., §35-1-19 (1953 as amended).

8.

Utah Code Ann., §35-1-39 (1953 as amended).

9.

Utah Code Ann., §35-1-42 (1953 as amended).

10.

Utah Code Ann., §35-1-46 (1953 as amended).

11.

Utah Code Ann., §35-1-57 (1953 as amended).

12.

Utah Code Ann., §35-1-58 (1953 as amended).

13.

Utah Code Ann., §35-1-60 (1953 as amended).

14.

Utah Code Ann., §35-1-62 (1953 as amended) (pre-

1975 amendment).
15.

Utah Code Ann., §35-1-62 (1953 as amended) (post-

1975 amendment).
The text of the foregoing statutes is reproduced in
full in Appendix A.

With respect to numbers 7, 8 and 10-13

above, the statutes reproduced in Appendix A reflect the provisions in effect in 1981 when the accident occurred which gave
rise to this action.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a negligence action against the general con-

tractor of a construction project by an employee of the general
contractors independent subcontractor for injuries the employee
received in an on-the-job accident.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Busch filed a motion for summary judgment

based on the exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Ann, §35 — 1 —
60.

While that motion was under advisement in the trial court,

plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on
the penalty provision of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-57.
C.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant

Busch1s

motion

for

summary

judgment

was

granted and plaintifffs motion for partial summary judgment was
denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On December 1, 1984, Busch was engaged as owner,

developer, and general contractor in the construction of Busch
Park, Phase III, a commercial office complex located in Salt
Lake County, Utah.
2.

(R., p. 2, 1[4 and pp. 30-31).

Busch had subcontracted with Thermal Energy Amal-

gamated Manufacturing Corporation (TEAM) for the manufacture and

-3-

installation of aggregate rock "crystal panels" on a building
involved in Phase III.
3.

In

the

(R., p. 34, 1f2 and p. 45).
contract

between

Busch

and

TEAM,

TEAM

agreed to purchase and maintain workmen1s compensation insurance
and also represented

and agreed

that it was the holder of a

specific workraenfs compensation insurance policy.

(R., p. 148

1(4).
4.
individuals

Plaintiff, Timothy
employed

by

TEAM

R. Bosch was one of several

to install

the crystal panels.

(R., p. 2, 1(3).
5.

On December 1, 1981 while engaged in his employ-

ment with regard to the Busch Park Phase III project, plaintiff
fell from a beam in the building on the construction site and
received personal injuries.

(R., p. 2, 1(3; p. 3, 1(6 and p. 148,

1(5).
6.

Plaintiff

has

received

workmen's

compensation

benefits with regard to the injuries he received in the December
1, 1981 incident.

(R., p. 148, 1[6).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 provides that the right to

recover compensation under the Workmenfs Compensation Act shall
be the exclusive remedy against the "employer".
defined in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42.

"Employer" is

Plaintiff has conceded on

appeal that Busch is his "employer" as defined in §35-1-42.
Plaintifffs exclusive remedy against Busch, therefore, is the
workmen1s compensation benefits he has received.
-4-

2.

Utah

Code

Ann.

§35-1-62, preserves

an

injured

employee's right to maintain a tort action against third parties
"other than the employer".

The 1975 amendment to that provision

does not abrogate the civil immunity accorded "employers", including Busch, under the exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-60.
3.

Busch, as

|
plaintiff's

"statutory

employer", is

entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision of
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60, regardless of who actually paid benefits.

It is contrary to the plain language of the Workmen's

Compensation Act to strip from Busch the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision simply because plaintiff received workmen's compensation benefits from the subcontractor's insurance
company and not from Busch.

Denying Busch the benefit of the

exclusive remedy provision under those circumstances also de-

i

feats the purpose for which the "statutory employer" provision
was enacted.
4.

Busch has complied with the requirements imposed

by the Workmen's Compensation Act, and plaintiff has received
workmen's compensation benefits.

The penalty provision of Utah

Code Ann. §35-1-57 has no application to this case and does not
entitle plaintiff to maintain his action.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
In the trial court, Busch filed a motion * for summary
judgment, arguing that it was plaintiff's "employer" as defined
-5-

in §42' and that, accordingly, under §60, plaintiff's exclusive
remedy

against

Busch

is the workmen's

plaintiff has already received.

compensation

benefits

Plaintiff argued that Busch was

not plaintiff's "employer"2 and that, in any event, even if
Busch were plaintiff's employer, the exclusive remedy provision
of §60 did not preclude plaintiff's suit against Busch.

The

trial court ruled that Busch is plaintiff's "employer" as defined in §42 and that, pursuant to §60, plaintiff's exclusive remedy against Busch is the workmen's compensation benefits he has
received.

As discussed more fully in Points I through III be-

low, the trial court's granting Busch's motion for summary judgment was proper and should be affirmed.
Additionally, plaintiff filed a motion in the trial
court for partial summary judgment, arguing that even if Busch
is plaintiff's "employer" under §42 and entitled

to immunity

under

his

§60,

plaintiff

may

nevertheless

maintain

action

against Busch pursuant to the penalty provision in §57.
lower court denied plaintiff's motion.

The

As more fully discussed

in Point IV below, the trial court's denial of plaintiff's mo-

1

All references to section numbers refer to that section as
found in Title 35, Chapter 1, Utah Code Ann., as in effect in
December 1981, unless indicated otherwise.

2

Apparently to avoid any inconsistency with the argument under
Point II of his brief regarding the penalty provision of §57,
plaintiff has conceded on appeal that Busch is plaintiff's
"employer" as defined in §42.
-6-

tion for partial summary judgment was proper and should be affirmed •
POINT I.
AS PLAINTIFF'S "STATUTORY EMPLOYER11,
BUSCH IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION OF §60
Section 60 of the Workmen's Compensation
Code Ann. §35-1-1, et seq.)

Act (Utah

(the Act) states in part as fol-

lows :
The right to recover compensation pursuant to
the provisions of this title for injuries
sustained by an employee, whether resulting
in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer...and no action at
law may be maintained against an employer...based upon any accident, injury or death
of an employee.
The term "employer11 is not defined in §60.
§42.

It is defined in

That section defines "employer", in part, as one who "pro-

cures any work to be done wholly or in part for him by a [sub]contractor...."

This

is

the so-called

"statutory employer"

provision.
On appeal, plaintiff has conceded that Busch is his
"employer" as defined in §42.

Furthermore, it is undisputed

that Busch has received workmenfs compensation benefits.
Section 60 clearly states that the right to recover
workmen's compensation benefits shall be the exclusive remedy
against the "employer".

Section 60 does not define "employer"

and does not differentiate between the actual employer and the
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so-called "statutory employer".

The plain language of §60 indi-

cates that plaintiff's exclusive remedy against Busch, plaintiff's "statutory employer", is the workmen's compensation benefits plaintiff has already received.

Accordingly, the lower

court's granting Busch's motion for summary judgment was correct
and should be affirmed.
POINT II.
SECTION 62 DOES NOT ELIMINATE BUSCHfS
RIGHT TO THE BENEFIT OF THE EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY PROVISION OF §60
Despite

the

foregoing,

plaintiff

argues

that

§62,

relating to actions against third parties, entitles him to maintain a tort action against Busch.

The fallacy of plaintiff's

argument will be demonstrated below first by examining the background

and

history

of

the

workmen's

compensation

statutory

scheme, and specifically the "statutory employer" provision in
§42 and, second, by a close examination of §62 and the 1975
amendment.
A.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Prior to the enactment in 1917 of Utah's Workmen's

Compensation Act, an employee injured on the job was in the same
position as any other victim of a tort.

That is, in order to

recover for injuries sustained in an on-the-job accident, the
employee was required to pursue a tort action and prove negligence against the tortfeasor.
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If the employee1s injuries were caused by the negligence of the employer, the employer might ultimately be found
liable and be required to compensate the employee for his or her
injuries.

In the meantime, however, the injured employee would

be faced with the uncertainty, cost, delay, and other negative
effects associated with a tort action.

The injuries might pre-

vent the employee from returning to work, leaving the employee
without means of support and ability to pay hospital and doctor
Moreover, the employeeTs recovery of compensation might

bills.

be barred completely because of some defense such as contributory negligence.

The injured employee and the employee's family

could become a burden on society as welfare becomes the only
resort.
In 1917, the Utah Legislature attempted to remedy the
situation described above by enacting the Workmen's Compensation
Act.

The Act established "a no-fault system...to guarantee an

employee some financial compensation for injuries incurred by
him in the scope of his employment...ff

Hinds v. Herm Hughes &

Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1978) (Wilkins, J. dissenting).

The Act enabled such an injured employee to recover the

compensation enumerated in the Act without regard to fault and
without having to prove negligence.

The primary purpose of the

Act was
to eliminate the uncertainty, the time, effort and expense involved in the old system

which required an injured employee to prove
negligence of his employer as a pre-requisite
to any recovery, and to create a system
whereby the injured employee would be assured
of medical and hospital care, and a certain
though modest compensation for injuries and
disabilities suffered, with the attendant
benefits to themselves, their families, and
to society generally, including the stabilizing effect upon the economy.
Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1972).
Under the Act, the burden

fell on the employer to

"secure compensation" so that an injured employee would be paid
the benefits provided for in the Act.

The idea was to shift the

burden of an employee's injury away from the employee, who was
least able to bear it, to the employer, who was better able to
bear it.

The Act did not require the employer actually to pay

workmen's compensation benefits to an injured employee.
Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §52a.

1917

The Act merely imposed upon an em-

ployer the obligation to "secure compensation" and ensure that
workmen's compensation insurance coverage was in place to pay
benefits in the event an employee were injured.
Ch. 100, §53.
workmen's

1917 Utah Laws,

The cost of fulfilling this obligation to secure

compensation

insurance coverage

for the

benefit of

employees who might be injured on the job became simply an additional cost of doing business for the employer.3
Had the Workmen's Compensation Act merely conferred a
benefit on the employee and imposed a burden on the employer, it
would have been nothing more than a legislated welfare system
with the injured employee as the recipient and the employer as
the provider.

However, the statutory scheme created by the

Workmen's Compensation Act contemplated a counterbalancing arrangement whereby the employee receiving the benefit would also
relinquish something, and the employer upon whom the burden is
placed would receive something in return.
the Act which

3

provided

The "quid pro quo" of

this counterbalancing

effect was the

For most employers, the requirement of the Act to "secure
compensation" meant that the employer had to purchase a workmen's compensation insurance policy from either a private
insurance company or the State Insurance Fund. The additional cost of doing business for such employers was, therefore,
the cost of the premium to obtain the workmen's compensation
policy.
The Act also allowed an employer to "secure compensation" by
qualifying as a self-insurer.
In such cases, the employer
itself, rather than an insurance company, actually paid benefits to an injured employee. However, even where the employer as self-insurer actually paid benefits, the burden imposed
by the Act was simply an additional cost of doing business.
The self-insured employer would merely retain the amount it
would have paid in premiums to an outside insurance company
for workmen's compensation insurance coverage and provide
that coverage itself. In effect, the employer became its own
insurance company. Presumably, for such an employer with a
large number of employees, the additional cost of doing business incurred as a result of actually paying benefits would
be no greater than, and perhaps less than, the cost of premiums to an outside insurance company.
-11-

exclusive

remedy

provision

found

in the predecessor

to §60.

1917, Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §71.
The exclusive remedy provision in the 1917 Act stated
that, except in certain circumstances, "the right to recover
compensation pursuant to the provisions of this Act for injuries
sustained by an employee shall be the exclusive remedy against
the employer...".

Hence, in exchange for receiving certain and

almost immediate compensation benefits in the event of an injury, the employee gives up the right to sue his employer.

On

the other hand, in exchange for incurring the additional cost of
doing business created by the requirement to "secure compensation" for its employees, the employer is given the benefit of
immunity

from tort actions by injured

employee is protected

employees.

Thus, the

from the uncertainty, cost, delay, and

other negative effects of a tort action and is given certain and
almost immediate compensation, while the employer is protected
from the "hazards of exorbitant and in some instances, ruinous
liabilities."

Adamson v. Okland Construction Co., 508 P.2d 805,

807 (Utah 1973) .
When

the Workmenfs

Compensation

Act was originally

enacted in 1917, the definition of "employer" in the predecessor
to §42, so far as relevant, spoke in terms of only actual common-law employers.

1917 Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §50.

See general-

ly, Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561, 564 (Wilkins, J. dissenting) ("This Court, though, used the touchstone
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of common-law

principles defining

the master-servant

relation-

ship in aid of [the Act's] definition [of employer].w)

Actual

employers constituted the class of employers subject to the provisions of the Act.
With

the addition

in

1919 of the statutory

employer

provision in the predecessor to §42, the definition of "employer" expanded

to include not only actual common-law

employers,

but also "statutory employers"; that is, those such as general
contractors who at common law were not employers, but who procured work to be done for them by independent
1919 Utah Laws, Ch. 63, §3110.
adopting

the "statutory

subcontractors.

The effect of the 1919 amendment

employer"

provision

and

expanding

the

category of "employers" subject to the Act is illustrated below.
The areas highlighted in blue represent the category of "employers" as defined in the Act.

1919 Amendment

1917 Act

MPLOYER"

ff

General
Contractor

General
Contractor

1 EMPLOYER
**

»* i

Indep.
Sub7
Actual
Employer

Indep.
Suby
Actual
Employer
»

1

m

Employee

Employee
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With this expansion of the category of employers subject to the Act came also an expansion of the category of employers entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision.

Prior to 1919, the exclusive remedy provision (the pre-

decessor to §60) stated that the right to recover compensation
pursuant to the provisions of the Act shall be the exclusive
remedy against the "employer".

Before 1919, the term "employer"

was defined in the predecessor to §42 in terras of actual commonlaw employers.

Therefore, the exclusive remedy provision ex-

tended only to actual common-law employers.
After the 1919 amendment, the predecessor to §60 still
provided that the right to recover compensation pursuant to the
provisions of the Act shall be the exclusive remedy against the
"employer".

However, the term "employer" was now defined as not

only actual common-law employers, but also "statutory employers".

Therefore, the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision

extended

to both

employers".

actual

common-law

employers

and

"statutory

Since 1919, there has been no substantive change in

the relevant language of either §42, defining "employer", or
§60, indicating those entitled to the benefits of the exclusive
remedy provision.
It is critical to note that in adopting the "statutory
employer" provision and in expanding the category of those upon
whom was imposed the burden of securing compensation for injured
employees, the Legislature did not create some special framework

-14-

to apply only to "statutory employers".

The Legislature did not

specifically indicate that "statutory employers" should be given
any greater burden or accorded any less favorable treatment than
actual employers.

The Legislature merely expanded the defini-

tion of "employer", which was already in place, and allowed the
other provisions of the Act where the term "employer" was used,
including the exclusive remedy provision in the predecessor to
§60, to remain unchanged.
Such indicates an intention on the part of the Legislature to extend the same immunity to "statutory employers" as
was enjoyed by actual employers.

The Legislature did not intend

merely to impose a burden without also giving the "quid pro quo"
which is the hallmark of the workmenfs compensation statutory
scheme.
statutory

Had the Legislature not extended the same immunity to
employers, it would

have been

creating

a type of

legislated welfare system with the employee as recipient and the
"statutory employer" as provider.

The language of the Act indi-

cates that such was not the intention of the Legislature.
Giving immunity to "statutory employers" is consistent
with the original purpose of the "statutory employer" provision.
As indicated above, the original definition of "employer" spoke
in terras of only actual common-law employers.

One in the posi-

tion of a general contractor who hired independent subcontractors was not, therefore, an "employer" subject to the Act.

This

situation allowed unscrupulous employers to avoid the require-

-15-

ment to secure compensation for their employees.

Rather than

hire employees in a typical common-law relationship, such an
employer

could

instead

engage

an irresponsible

or even sham

independent subcontractor who would then hire employees to do
the work.

Because technically it was not the "employer" of the

subcontractor's employees, the general was not required to secure compensation for those employees.

When an injured employee

sought workmen1s compensation benefits, the employee would discover that the subcontractor had not secured any insurance coverage and that the subcontractor was judgment-proof.

The em-

ployee could not seek workmen's compensation benefits from the
general contractor because it was not technically an "employer".
See generally Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561,
564-565 (Utah 1978) (Wilkins, J. dissenting).
The

"statutory

employer"

provision

is

designed

to

prevent the kind of situation described above from.occurring.
The purpose of the provision is
to protect employees of irresponsible and
uninsured subcontractors by imposing ultimate
liability on the presumably responsible principal contractor, who has it within his power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon
their responsibility and insist upon appropriate compensation protection for their workers .
Pinter

Construction

Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d

305, 307 (Utah

1984).

Stated otherwise, the object of the "statutory employer"

provision is "to give the general contractor an incentive to
require subcontractors to carry insurance."
Compensation Law §72.31(b) at 14-49 (1986).

2 Larsen, Workmen1s

The provision makes the general contractor an "employer" and imposes upon it the same duty to "secure compensation"
as is imposed upon the actual employer, making the general contractor ultimately liable if there was no workmen1s compensation
insurance coverage.

The burden on the general contractor to

"secure compensation" and the ultimate liability if such compensation is not secured provides the incentive for the general
contractor to hire responsible subcontractors and to insist that
they maintain workmen's compensation insurance coverage.
If not given immunity, the "statutory employer" would
have little if any incentive to ensure that only responsible
subcontractors are hired and to insist that the subcontractor
carry appropriate

compensation

protection

for their workers.

Without immunity, the general contractor has the same ultimate
exposure to liability whether or not the subcontractor maintains
insurance.

On the one hand, if the subcontractor has insurance,

the general contractor is subject both to liability for workmen's compensation benefits4 and also to tort liability.

4

On the

The general contractor is ultimately subject to liability for
workmen's compensation benefits because §62 provides that the
employer or insurance carrier who pays benefits to the injured employee becomes "trustee of the cause of action against
the third party and may bring and maintain the action either
in its own name or in the hame of the injured employe...."
Hence, if an injured employee recovers workmen's compensation
benefits from the actual employer's insurance company, that
insurance company may maintain an action against the general
contractor to recover the amount of the benefits paid.
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other hand, if the subcontractor does not have insurance, the
general contractor is in the same position:

it is subject both

to liability for workmen's compensation benefits as an "employer" and also to tort liability.

The general contractor is in no

better

responsible

position

insisting

that

by
it

hiring
maintain

a

appropriate

subcontractor
insurance

and

coverage.

Removing the general contractor's immunity, therefore, ultimately defeats the purpose for which the "statutory employer" provision was adopted.
In summary, the language of the Act and of the "statutory employer" provision indicates that the Legislature intended
merely

to

plug

the

framework created

"statutory

by the Act.

employer"

into

the

statutory

That framework comprehends a

counterbalancing arrangement whereby the "quid pro quo" of the
exclusive remedy provision is given to the "employer", including
"statutory employer", in exchange for the burden imposed by the
Act.

Furthermore, the purpose for which the "statutory employ-

er" provision was adopted would be defeated by not extending to
the "statutory employer" the benefit of the exclusive remedy
provision of §60.

Busch, as plaintiff's "statutory employer"

is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of §60's exclusive remedy
provision.
B.

Section 62 AND THE 1975 AMENDMENT
As indicated above, in 1917 the Utah Legislature en-

acted the Workmen's Compensation Act.
-18-

The Act created a coun-

terbalancing statutory framework wherein employees were assured
of certain benefits in the event of injury but relinquished the
right to maintain a tort action against their employer, and the
employer was given the burden of securing compensation for injured employees but was given the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision.
An employee's on-the-job injuries might, however, be
caused by the negligence of some third party outside the statutory framework created by the Act.

Such a third party did not

have the same burden under the Act as an "employer" and should
not, therefore, benefit

from the exclusive remedy provision.

There was no reason not to leave such a third party subject to
common-law tort liability.
Accordingly, the Legislature adopted a provision which
preserved an injured employee's right to sue such third party
or, if the employee elected to take compensation under the Act,
allowed the employer or insurance company paying benefits to sue
such third party to recover the amount paid as benefits.
Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §72.

1917,

That provision, which is the prede-

cessor to §62, enabled an injured employee to elect whether to
take compensation under the Act or to maintain a tort action
against "another not in the same employ", whose negligence caused the employee's injury.
quently amended

Although the provision was subse-

to allow an injured employee both to receive

compensation under the Act and to pursue a tort action against
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the

third

party,

the

relevant

language

remained

essentially

unchanged until 1975.
Decisions from this Court have consistently held that
the

ability

against

of

a third

an

injured

person

employee

pursuant

to

pursue

a

tort

action

to §62 does not abrogate

right of the "employer", as defined

the

in §42, to the benefit of

the exclusive remedy provision of §60 .
In

Smith

v.

Alfred

Brown

Co.,

493

P.2d

994

(Utah

1972), Brown was the general contractor on a construction project.

It subcontracted

the masonry work to Ashton, who subse-

quently employed the plaintiff as a brick mason.
was injured
ages.

in an on-the-job

accident

The plaintiff

and sued Brown for dam-

The relationship among the parties in the Smith case is

illustrated in the diagram below.
Smith v. Alfred Brown Co.

H

"EMPLOYER" ~ 1
Brown
(Gen. Contractor)

i

Ashton
(Indep. SubV
Actual Employer)

Plaintiff
(Employee)

Although the plaintiff argued

that Brown was a third

person "not in the same employment", the Court analyzed the case
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in terms of whether Brown were plaintiff's "statutory employer".
The Court found that Brown was plaintiff's "statutory employer"
and

concluded

that, pursuant

to §60, "the plaintiff would

be

covered by workmen's compensation as an employee of the [statutory employer] and thus precluded
Id. at p. 996.
applicable

from maintaining

this suit."

Essentially, the Court considered §62 not to be

since

Brown

was

the

"employer"

and

was

therefore

entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision.
Similarly, in Adamson v. Okland Construction Co., 508
P.2d 805 (Utah 1973), Okland was the general contractor for the
construction of a hospital.

Okland entered in to a subcontract

with Winward

plaintiff's decedent, Adamson, who

was killed

which employed

in an on-the-job

accident.

The relationship among

the parties in Adamson is diagrammed below.

Adamson v. Okland Construction Co
1

"EMPLOYER" ""1

Okland

J

I I (Gen. Contractor) 11

Winward
(Indep. Sub./
Actual Employer)

Plaintiff
(Employee)
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The Court found the defendant Okland to be plaintiff's
"statutory employer" and had no problem "in holding that, therefore, the workmen's compensation was plaintiff's exclusive remedy as against these employers."
Court essentially considered

JLcK at p. 808.

Again, the

§62 to be inapplicable and ruled

that since Okland was plaintiff's "employer", as defined in §42,
it was entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision
of §60.

In 1975, the relevant language of §62 was amended.
Following that amendment, the Court again had an opportunity to
decide whether a "statutory employer" was entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision of §60 in spite of the
now-amended §62.
561

In Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d

(Utah 1978), Hughes was an independent subcontractor who

contracted to construct a building for the general contractor^.
Hughes contracted with Hayes to construct the masonry walls in
the

5

building.

The plaintiff,

Hinds, was an

employee of Hayes

Although Hughes was not technically a general contractor, in
relation to plaintiff it was essentially in a position
equivalent to a general contractor.
-22-

and

was

injured

in an on-the-job

accident.

The

relationship

among the parties is illustrated below.
Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc.
"EMPLOYER"
Hughes
(Gen. Contractor)

Hayes
(Indep. Suby
Actual Employer)

Plaintiff
(Employee)

The

Court

considered

the

1975 amendment

to

§62 and

stated that this amendment
enables an employee to sue a tortfeasor, not
his employer [i.e. "employer" as defined in
§42 which includes "statutory employer11 ].. .
even though the injured person and the tortfeasor may be engaged in the same employment.
Id. at p. 562 (Emphasis added).
it considered

The Court then focused on what

to be the main question; namely, whether

Hughes

was the "statutory employer" of Hinds at the time of the accident.

The Court discussed the type of control a statutory em-

ployer

must

exercise

and

indicated

that

the

conflict as to the control exercised by Hughes.
stated

that "Mr. Hinds1

right

evidence

was

in

The Court then

to recover in this case depends

upon his showing that Hughes did not have any right to control
the work of Hayes1 employees".

I6_. at p. 563.
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In other words,

Hinds1 right to recover depended on his showing that Hughes was
not his statutory employer.
The dissent in Hinds chided the majority for not addressing what the dissent considered to be the critical issue•
The dissent argued that the 1975 amendment to §62 was "a manifestation of legislative intent to eliminate from immunity those
persons who fell under the umbrella of statutory employer prior
to the amendment."
interesting
"statutory

_Id_. at p. 566.

Although providing some

insights into the background

of the Act and the

employer" provision, the dissent in Hinds—as the

plaintiff in this case—failed to discern the correct interpretation of the 1975 amendment to §62.
Prior to the 1975 amendment, §62 stated in part as
follows:
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this title shall have
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another person not in the same employment,
the injured employee, or in case of death his

6

If in fact the Legislature did intend in the 1975 amendment
to abrogate a "statutory employees" immunity, the 1975
amendment was anything but a clear manifestation of intent to
that effect. Had that truly been the Legislature's intent,
that change could have clearly and unambiguously been effected by simply adding the single word "actual" to the exclusive
remedy provision of §60 (i.e., workmenfs compensation benefits shall be an injured employeefs "exclusive remedy against
the actual employer"). The substantive right of a "statutory
employer" to civil immunity should not be deemed to have been
abrogated by legislative action unless the Legislature^
intent is expressed more clearly than it was expressed in the
1975 amendment to §62.
-24-

dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal
representative may also have an action for
damages against such third person,
(Emphasis added).

The "same employment" language of §62 was

given an expansive interpretation by this Court, resulting in
civil immunity being given to some who were not intended to have
it.
In Peterson

v. Fowler, 493

P.2d

997

(Utah

1972),

plaintiffs were the dependents of Peterson, who had been killed
in the course of his employment on a construction site.

Plain-

tiffs claimed that his death was caused by the negligence of
Lauren Burt, an independent subcontractor who had been hired by
the same general contractor who had hired the deceased.

The

relationship among the parties in the Peterson case is illustrated below.
Peterson v. Fowler
General
Contractor

Lauren Burt,
Inc.
[Defendant]
(Independent
Subcontractor)

Peterson
[Plaintiff]
(Employee of
General
Contractor)

As can be seen from the illustration above, the defendant in Peterson—unlike the defendants in Smith, Adamson, and
Hinds—was neither the plaintiff's actual common-law employer
-25-

nor the plaintiff's "statutory employer".

The Court analyzed

whether plaintiff could maintain his suit against Lauren Burt,
not in terms of whether Lauren Burt were plaintiff's "employer"
or "statutory employer" and, therefore, entitled to the benefits
of the exclusive remedy provision, but rather in terms of whether Lauren Burt were in the "same employment" as plaintiff and,
therefore, not

subject to suit pursuant

to §62.

The court

stated as follows:
The term "same employment" has not been defined by our courts in connection with actions by employees against third parties,
that is, against one other than their employer . However, the idea of "same employment"
was well known in connection with the fellowservant rule of law prior to the enactment of
the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The term
"same employment" as set out in our Workmen's
Compensation Act should be given the meaning
which had been attached to it under the cases
decided up to that time.
Peterson v. Fowler, supra, at p. 999 (Emphasis added).
The Court then discussed the standard applicable to
the fellow-servant rule and stated as follows:
To be fellow servants, they must be engaged
in the same line of work and labor together
in such personal relations that they can
exercise an influence upon each other promotive of proper caution in respect of their
mutual safety. They should be at the time of
the injury directly operating with each other
in the particular business at hand, £ £ they
must be operating so that mutual duties bring
them into such co-association that they may
exercise an influence upon each other to use
proper caution and be so situated in their
labor to some extent as to be able to supervise and watch the conduct of each other as
to skill, diligence, and carefulness. When
-26-

workmen are so engaged, we think they are
working in the same employment.
Id. at p. 1000 (Emphasis added).
The Court stated that §62 allows an injured employee
to sue a third party for wrongful acts resulting in death or
injury "provided the third party is not in the same employment".
Id. at p. 1000.

The Court concluded that the plaintiff and

Lauren Burt were engaged

in the "same employment" and that,

therefore, plaintiff was not able to maintain his action against
Lauren Burt.
The original purpose of §62 was to preserve an injured
employee1s right to maintain a tort action against third persons
who did not enjoy immunity by virtue of being an "employer".
The effect of the Peterson decision and of its interpretation of
the

"same

employment"

language, however, was potentially to

insulate from liability virtually anyone working in relatively
close proximity to the injured employee on the same job site.
Almost anyone on the job site at the time of the injury could,
under the Peterson language, be considered to be in the "same
employment" and therefore not subject to suit.
Prompted by the holding of cases such as Peterson v.
Fowler, the Utah Legislature in 1975 amended §62 to remove the
"same employment" language and to prevent results similar to
that reached in Peterson v. Fowler.
amendment, §62 provided
person

Whereas, prior to the 1975

that an employee could

not in the same employment", that
-27-

sue "another

section

after the

amendment provides that an employee may sue "a person other than
an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer".

The

amendment also added a provision indicating that an employee may
sue "subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not occupying
an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or death."

(Emphasis add-

ed) 7 .
The purpose of the amendment was to enable an injured
employee to sue a negligent third person—such as the independent subcontractor in Peterson v. Fowler—who, under prior law,
would have been immune because it was "in the same employment"
as the injured employee.

The idea was to make sure that subcon-

tractors and other workers—other than the "employer" as defined
in §42—would not continue to have civil immunity extended to

7

The amendment indicates that the employee may sue subcontractors, general contractors, etc., not occupying an employeeemployer relationship, "notwithstanding the provisions of
[§42]."
The "notwithstanding" language simply makes no
sense. Section 42 defines all employers, not just "statutory
employers" who are subject to the Act. Essentially, then,
this provision of the amendment states that notwithstanding
how an employer is defined for purposes of the Act, an employee may sue subcontractors, general contractors, etc. who
are not employers. The "notwithstanding" language seems to
indicate that the definition of employer should be ignored
for this provision, but then the provision later brings that
definition back in by stating only those who are not employers may be sued.
While the "notwithstanding" language is
ambiguous and difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with
the rest of the amendment, the language of the amendment
taken as a whole and the placement of the amendment in §62
relating to actions against third persons "other than the
employer" support the conclusion that the amendment was intended to effect the result discussed in Buschfs brief.
-28-

them as Peterson v. Fowler suggested it should be.

The intent

was not to abrogate civil immunity on behalf of "statutory employers".

The effect of the 1975 amendment to §62 was to con-

fine the immunity granted by the Act only to those who were
intended to have it; namely, "employers" as defined in §42. The
amendment had the effect of overruling Peterson v. Fowler and
bringing Utah within the majority of jurisdictions which hold
that a subcontractor, such as the one held immune in Peterson v.
Fowler, is a "third person" amenable to suit .
The scant legislative history accompanying
amendment supports the foregoing conclusion.
§62 was contained in Senate Bill No. 26.

the 1975

The amendment to

In his introduction of

the bill to the House, Representative Jim Hansen discussed the
provision relating to third-party actions and stated as follows:

8

There is a reason for giving civil immunity to "statutory
employers" while not giving it to subcontractors such as the
one in Peterson v. Fowler. The reason for that distinction
was stated by Professor Larsen, one of the foremost authorities on Workmen's Compensation, as follows:
When ... an employee of the general contractor ... sues the subcontractor in negligence,
the great majority of jurisdictions have held
that the subcontractor is a third party amenable to suit. The reason for the difference
in result [i.e., that a subcontractor is
amenable to suit while a general contractor/statutory employer is not] is forthright:
The general contractor has a statutory liability to the subcontractor's employee, actual or potential, while the subcontractor has
no comparable statutory liability to the
general contractor's employee.

2 Larsen, Workmen's Compensation Law, §72.32 at pp. 1450-1451
(1986).
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In effect what this says is an employer who
buys a workmen's comp. policy is excluded
from a tort action when he has an employee
working for him.
But let's say, hypothetically, that the employee working for the employer who put the workmen's comp. on is
injured by an outsider or third/another party. Say someone coming on the job, a subcontractor, somebody like that, he would then
have a right of action" against the negligent
party who created the tort or created the
negligence to the person who was injured.
Introduction

of

S.B.

26, Disk

318, Line

20, March

5,

1975.

(Emphasis added).
The result achieved by the amendment is illustrated in
the diagram below.
J O B SITE
Owner

Lessee

General
Contractor

Independent
Subcontractor/I
Actual
Employer

Independent
SubSubcontractor

Independent
Subcontractor^
Actual
Employer

Employee

Employee
(Plaintiff)

Employee
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Employee

The diagram

represents a relatively common situation

in the

construction industry where more than one general contractor,
and the subcontractors and employees of each, are situated on
the same job site engaged in different aspects of the project.
The

employee

highlighted

in

yellow

represents

the

injured

employee who is seeking compensation.
The injured employeefs "employers", as defined in §42,
are highlighted in blue.

Prior to the 1975 amendment, although

only "employers" of the injured employee were entitled to the
benefit of §60fs exclusive remedy provision, under the Peterson
interpretation of the "same employment" language of §62, all
others on the job site were potentially in the "same employment"
and,

therefore,

not

subject

to

tort

liability.

The

1975

amendment eliminated the "same employment" language and provided
instead that an injured employee may sue any "person other than
an employer".

Because of the 1975 amendment, all of the enti-

ties and individuals outside the blue highlighted area became
subject to tort liability since they were no longer potentially
in the "same employment" as the injured employee but became
"other than an employer" of the injured employee.
The effect of the 1975 amendment to §62 was recognized
by this Court in the case of Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co.,
Inc., 546 P.2d 826 (Utah 1976).

In that case, Shupe, a carpen-

ter, was employed by Christiansen Brothers, a general contractor, who had also hired the defendant, Wasatch Electric Company,
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an independent subcontractor.

The relationship among the par-

ties is indicated in the diagram below.
Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Company Inc,
Christiansen
Brothers
(General
Contractor)

Wasatch
Electric
[Defendant]
(Independent
Subcontractor)

Shupe
[Plaintiff]
(Employee of
Christiansen
Brothers)

Plaintiffs were the wife and daughter of Shupe who was killed in
an on-the-job accident, allegedly as a result of Wasatch Electric Company's negligence.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's granting
of summary judgment to Wasatch, holding that the 1975 amendment
did not apply to this action since the occurrences in question
took place before the amendment's effective date.
the

1975 amendment

In discussing

to §62, the Court stated that the Legisla-

ture, "undoubtedly being aware of the decisions of this Court
construing the terms 'same employment'", amended §62 and deleted
the "same employment" language^.

9

The Court stated that "[t]he

The court in Shupe erroneously states that the "same employment" language had previously been interpreted in Smith v.
Alfred Brown Co., supra and Adamson v. Okland Const. Co.,
supra. Id. at pp. 897 and 898. However, Peterson v. Fowler,
supra is the only case where the court construed the "same
employment" language. Smith and Adamson dealt with the question of what constitutes a statutory employer.
See also
Justice Maughan's dissent in Shupe at pp. 899 and 900.

amendment, if applicable, would leave the plaintiff's in court."
Id. at p. 898.
Had the amendment applied, therefore, the defendant in
Shupe would have been amenable to suit.

It is critical to note,

however, that the issue in Shupe was not whether a "statutory
employer" was entitled to civil immunity under §60.

The issue

was whether an independent subcontractor hired by the same general contractor as plaintiff's

decedent was to be construed

under former §62 as being "in the same employment" as plaintiff's decedent and, therefore, immune from suit, or whether he
was to be construed under amended §62 as "a person other than an
employer" and, therefore, subject to suit.

Resolution of the

issue in Shupe had no bearing on the issue of whether a statutory employer is entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy
provision of §60.
As indicated above, the dissenting opinion in Hinds
strongly argued that the 1975 amendment to §62 indicates a legislative intent to abrogate immunity on behalf of the "statutory
employer".

The majority, however, rejected that argument.
Hinds was decided nearly ten years ago in 1978.

The

Legislature is aware of the majority position in the Hinds decision.

Moreover, other cases have relied on Hinds in conclud-

ing that a "statutory employer" is entitled to immunity.

See,

e.g., Jensen v. Price River Coal Co., C-82-1135W (D. Utah 1984).
("The argument [that the 1975 amendment abrogated civil immunity

for statutory employers] is foreclosed by the result reached by
the majority in Hinds and by other post-1975 Utah decisions that
have consistently recognized

that the 1975 amendment did not

abrogate statutory employer's immunity").
Despite the elapse of 13 years since adoption of the
1975 amendment and ten years since this Court in Hinds construed
the amendment

not

to abrogate civil immunity

for "statutory

employers", the Legislature has taken no action to restrict the
class of "employers" entitled to the benefits of the exclusive
remedy provision.

If any such change is to be made it should be

made by the Legislature.
Section 62—even as amended in 1975—does not deprive
a "statutory employer" of the benefit of §60fs exclusive remedy
provision.

Busch, as

plaintiff's

"statutory

employer", is

therefore entitled to the benefit of that provision, and plaintiff may not maintain a tort action against Busch.
POINT III.
EVEN THOUGH IT DID NOT ACTUALLY PAY
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS TO PLAINTIFF,
BUSCH IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF
§60fS EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION
By incorporating Point II of the Amici brief in the
Marathon Steel Co. v. Placers, Inc. case, plaintiff in this case
argues that if immunity is granted to "statutory employers", it
should only be "when the actual employer has failed or is unable
to

provide

worker's

compensation
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benefits

and

the

statutory

employer has been required to, and in fact has assumed the responsibility

for

providing

benefits

to the

injured worker"•

(Amici brief, p. 16). If this argument is accepted, the purpose
for which the "statutory employer" provision was adopted would
be defeated.

Moreover, this argument fails to distinguish be-

tween the requirement to "secure compensation" and the actual
payment of benefits and erroneously assumes that where the actual employer has secured compensation, the "statutory employer"
has incurred no burden.
If plaintiff's argument is accepted, the purpose for
which the "statutory employer" provision was adopted would be
defeated.

The purpose of the "statutory employer" provision is

to give an incentive to the general contractor to hire responsible subcontractors and to insist that those subcontractors carry
workmen's compensation insurance coverage.
If a general contractor is granted immunity only when
the subcontractor fails to secure compensation, a general contractor has absolutely no incentive to hire responsible subcontractors and to insist that they carry insurance.

Indeed, a

general contractor would have an incentive to do the very thing
the "statutory employer" provision was attempting to avoid.

A

;eneral contractor would have the incentive to hire a sham subcontractor without any insurance coverage because the only way
,he general contractor would be afforded immunity would be if
,he subcontractor did not secure compensation.
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That is not the

type of incentive the "statutory employer" provision attempts to
create.
Professor Larsen stated in this regard as follows:
For many years, a comfortable majority of
jurisdictions held that the general contractor in these circumstances [i.e., where the
subcontractor carries insurance and the general is not required to pay benefits] remained a third-party subject to common-law liability. But there has been a marked trend in
more recent times toward granting immunity to
the general contractor when the subcontractor
was insured, and even when compensation has
been actually paid under the subcontractor's
policy.
The cases denying immunity to the general
contractor whose subcontractor is insured
proceed on the theory that the general contractor's status should be tested by his
actual relation to the subcontractor's employee on the given facts and at the specific
moment of the accident, not by his potential
liability if, for example, the subcontractor
failed to carry insurance.
In one sense,
this is rather harsh on the general contractor.
The object of the "contractor under"
[statutory employer] statutes is to give the
general contractor an incentive to require
subcontractors to carry insurance.
But if
the general contractor does conscientiously
insist on this insurance, his reward, under
these cases, is loss of exemption from thirdparty suit. A sounder result would seem to
be the holding that the overall responsibility of the general contractor for getting
subcontractors insured, and his latent liability for compensation if he does not,
should be sufficient to remove him from the
category of "third-party."
He is under a
continuing potential liability; he has thus
assumed a burden in exchange for which he
might well be entitled to immunity from damage suits, regardless of whether on the facts
of a particular case actual liability exists.
2 Larsen, Workmen's Compensation Law, §72.3Kb) at 14-49 to 1450 (1986).

Additionally,

plaintiff's

argument

assumes

that

a

"statutory employer" incurs an obligation only when the actual
employer has failed to pay workmen's compensation benefits to an
injured employee.
gated

In the first place, the employer is not obli-

to pay benefits to an injured employee, but is merely

obligated to "secure compensation" by purchasing insurance coverage so that if an employee is injured, an insurance policy is
in place and an insurance company or the State Insurance Fund
will pay the employee the benefits due under the Act.,u
Secondly, this burden of making sure that insurance
coverage is in place is the same for both the actual employer
and the "statutory employer."

As discussed above, the burden

imposed on even the actual employer is merely a financial burden
or an additional cost of doing business.

That additional cost

of doing business results from the insurance premium the actual
employer must pay to secure workmen's compensation insurance
coverage.

A "statutory employer" incurs that same additional

cost of doing business as the cost of the workmen's compensation
insurance premium is passed on to the general contractor/statutory employer by the subcontractor.

Indeed, in that situation,

the general contractor incurs more of a burden than the actual
employer since the actual employer has merely passed its cost
for the insurance premium on to the general contractor.

10 See footnote 3 above.

Granting the "statutory employer" immunity only when
the injured employee is unable to obtain workmen's compensation
benefits from the subcontractor's insurance company or the subcontractor not only is contrary to the language of the Act and
the statutory framework it created, but will also defeat the
very purpose for which the "statutory employer" provision was
adopted.

Accordingly,

this

Court

should

reject

plaintiff's

argument and should affirm the lower court's ruling that §60's
exclusive remedy provision prevents plaintiff from maintaining
this action against Busch.
POINT IV.
THE PENALTY PROVISION OF §57 DOES NOT
APPLY TO BUSCH AND PLAINTIFF MAY NOT
MAINTAIN HIS ACTION
Under Point II of his brief, plaintiff argues that
because

Busch

itself did

not directly purchase an insurance

policy providing for the payment of workmen's compensation benefits, it is subject to the penalty provision of §57.

Plaintif's

motion for partial summary judgment, denied by the trial court,
was based on this argument.
Plaintiff's novel argument is interesting but strained
and illogical.

It exalts form over substance and simply does

not make sense within the statutory framework of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.

The lower court's denial of plaintiff's mo-

tion for partial summary judgment was, therefore, proper and
should be affirmed.
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As indicated above, §60 provides that workmen's compensation benefits shall be plaintiff's exclusive remedy against
his "employer".

Busch is plaintiff's "employer" as that term is

defined in §42.

Accordingly, Busch is entitled to the benefit

of the exclusive remedy provision and is not subject to suit by
plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues, essentially,

chat although immune

under §60, a "statutory employer" is nevertheless subject to
suit under §57•

Plaintiff's argument suggests that the Legis-

lature intended to give immunity in one section and obliterate
it in another.

The Legislature cannot be presumed to have in-

tended such an inconsistent and absurd result.

See, Millett v.

Clark Klemick Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980).
Plaintiff's argument also assumes that Busch did not
comply with the provisions of §46.

However, Busch did comply

with the requirements of that section.

Section 46 requires an

employer to "secure compensation" by providing workmen's compensation insurance coverage for employees.

As discussed above,

the purpose for placing this burden on a general contractor was
to give the general contractor an incentive to hire responsible
subcontractors and

to insist that the subcontractors provide

workmen's compensation insurance coverage for their employees.
This requirement puts the ultimate responsibility on the presumably responsible general contractor who "has it within his
power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their responsi-
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bility and insist upon appropriate compensation protection for
their workers.11

Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P. 2d

305, 307 (Utah 1984).
Busch fulfilled the requirement imposed by the Act.
Busch insisted in its subcontract with TEAM that TEAM have workmen's compensation insurance coverage for its employees.
tiff was one of TEAM'S employees.

Plain-

He was injured in an on-the-

job accident and for those injuries received workmen's compensation benefits from TEAM'S insurer.

Plaintiff's receipt of com-

pensation for his injuries was made possible by Busch through
Busch's requirement that TEAM maintain workmen's compensation
insurance.
Plaintiff's argument loses sight of the purpose for
the penalty provision of §57.
penalize in the abstract.

The purpose of §57 is not to

Section 57 was not enacted in a vac-

uum, but was enacted as part of the Workmen's Compensation Act
and intended as a measure to motivate employers to make sure
that compensation benefits were available to be paid to injured
employees.
Even though plaintiff has already received the workmen's compensation benefits the Act contemplates, he now attempts to contort the provisions of the Act and impose a penalty
where it was not intended to be imposed.

It would be ludicrous

to impose a penalty where the very end the penalty was intended
to achieve has been accomplished.
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The penalty provision of §57 was designed as a measure
to ensure that injured employees receive compensation for injuries.

Plaintiff has received compensation, and it would be un-

fair to impose a penalty on Busch, whose efforts made those
benefits possible.

Busch has fully complied with the obligation

imposed upon it by the Act and is not subject to the penalty
provision of §57.
Furthermore, giving plaintiff the benefit of the penalty provision of §57 would be contrary to the purpose and intent of §57 and §58.

Section 57 provides that employers who

fail to comply with the provisions of §46 shall be liable in a
civil action to injured employees.

Section 58 provides that the

employee may, in lieu of proceeding against the employer under
§57, receive the compensation as provided in the Act.

An injur-

ed employee, therefore, is required to choose between maintaining a civil action against the employer under §57 or, in lieu
thereof, filing an application with the Commission pursuant to
§58 for compensation as provided in the Act.
If plaintifffs argument is accepted, plaintiff would
have the benefit of both sections.

He not only would receive

the workmen1s compensation benefits provided for in the Act, but
also would be entitled to proceed against Busch under §57. Such
a result would be unfair to Busch and inconsistent with the
purpose and intent of the Actfs penalty provisions.
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In support of his argument that Busch should be penalized under §57, plaintiff argues that the purpose of the "statutory

employer"

provision

is to provide duplicative

compensation insurance coverage.

worker's

Adopting plaintiff's argument

would result in economic waste and a windfall to insurance companies.
Suppose a general contractor engages an independent
subcontractor who in turn engages another independent subcontractor who hires an individual as an employee.

Under plain-

tiff's view, the general contractor, the subcontractor under it,
and the subcontractor under it would each be required to obtain
a separate insurance policy providing for the payment of workmen's compensation benefits.
subcontractor

is injured

and

If an employee of the lowest level
receives

workmen's

compensation

benefits through the policy purchased by that subcontractor (his
actual employer), the policies provided by the general contractor and its subcontractor become meaningless, and the premiums
paid for those policies would be entirely wasted.

The only

beneficiary in this kind of scenario is the insurance companies
who received premiums for duplicative insurance.

The Legisla-

ture should not be presumed to have intended such a ridiculous
result where economic waste occurs and where no greater protection is afforded to workers.
What is contemplated by the "statutory employer" provision is not duplicative insurance coverage, but duplicative
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responsibility.

The purpose for the provision was "to give the

general contractor an incentive to require subcontractors to
carry insurance", 2 Larsen Workmen's Compensation Law, §72.31(b)
at 14-49 (1986), and to impose ultimate liability on the general
contractor if it did not.

It is in the general contractor's

interest, therefore, to hire only responsible subcontractors and
to insist that they acquire workmen's compensation insurance
coverage for their employees.

If a subcontractor does not ob-

tain workmen's compensation insurance coverage and is insolvent,
the injured worker can look to the general contractor for benefits.
Plaintiff also argues that failure to penalize Busch
will encourage similarly situated general contractors to "run
roughshod over the job site" (Appellant's brief, p. 15) and to
ignore safety considerations.

Apart frota ignoring the practical

reality that a general contractor who does not give consideration to safety simply cuts his own throat because of the delay,
work interruption, and cost which injuries create, plaintiff's
argument ignores other provisions of the Act which apply to a
"statutory employer" and which provide substantial incentive to
maintain a safe workplace.
One such provision is found in §19 which authorizes
the Industrial Commission to investigate complaints of unsafe
workplaces and, if necessary, to petition the District Court of
Utah for a temporary injunction restraining the further opera-
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tion of business.

Additionally, §39 imposes the penalty of

misdemeanor upon any "employer" (including, under §42, "statutory employer") who fails to obey an order made by the Commission.

The threats of having the business shut down and of being

guilty of a misdeameanor provide the real incentive to maintain
a safe workplace.
Plaintiff argues that if only the actual employer is
required to obtain workmenfs compensation insurance coverage and
an employee is injured due to the negligence of a "statutory
employer", the 15 percent surcharge on compensation paid would
be unfair to the actual employer's insurance carrier.

Assuming

that in such a situation the actual employer's insurance carrier
would be required to pay the 15 percent surcharge, it is inconceivable how requiring the general contractor to obtain separate
and duplicative insurance coverage would make any difference.
Plaintiff also argues that the 15 percent surcharge
paid by the actual employer's carrier would be unfair to the
actual employer since its workmen's compensation premiums are
based upon the risk assumed.

However, that risk would presum-

ably include the entire job site, including whatever effects the
general contractor's presence and involvement would have.

In

any event, there is no unfairness to the subcontractor/actual
employer.

The premium for workmen's compensation insurance, in

whatever amount, is passed on to the general contractor in the
contract with the general contractor.
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Plaintiff argues further that the more control a general contractor has over a subcontractor, the more likely the
general contractor will be deemed an immune "statutory employer"
and that, consequently, statutory

employers who direct every

action of the subcontractor's employees are encouraged to do so
negligently.

Plaintiff's argument makes no sense.

In the first

place, to have sufficient "supervision or control" to qualify as
a "statutory employer", the general contractor need only "retain
ultimate control over the [construction] project".

Bennett v.

Industrial Commission of Utah, 726 P.2d 427, 432 (Utah 1986).
Moreover, the more control a general contractor exercises over
the subcontractor

and

its employees, the closer the general

contractor comes to being considered the actual employer.

Whe-

ther actual employer or "statutory employer", however, the general contractor would be an "employer" subject to the requirement to "secure compensation" and also subject to the Commission's authority and power to have the further operation of an
unsafe business restrained.
In summary, the Act does not contemplate duplicative
insurance, but duplicative

responsibility.

The Act and its

penalty provisions were intended to ensure the payment of benefits to injured employees.

That purpose has been achieved in

this case as plaintiff has received benefits.

The penalty pro-

vision of §57 does not apply in this case, and plaintiff may not
maintain his action based on that provision.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant/respondent Busch
Development Inc•, respectfully requests the Court to affirm the
lower court's granting Busch's motion for summary judgment and
denying plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.
DATED this 8th day of February, 1988.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

t^u^/r J
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APPENDIX

1917 Utah Laws, Ch. 100

Sec. 50. Employers subject to this Act. The following shall constitute employers subject to the provisions of this Act:
(1) The State and each county, city, town and school district
therein.
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, including every
public utility, that has in service four or more workmen or operatives
regularly in the same business, or in or about the same establishment
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except
agricultural laborers and domestic servants; provided, that employers
who have in service less than four employes shall have the right to
come under the terms of this Act by complying with the provisions
thereof, and all the rules and regulations of the commission. The term
4
' regularly" as herein used shall include all employments, whether
continuous throughout the year or for only a portion of the year.
It means all employments in the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of an employer.

Sjefc. 52a. Payments o. compensation. If a
VOT])ppg^J^j^^^Si
sonal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer, or the insurance carrier shall pay compensation in the amounts and to the person or persons hereinafter specified.

1917 Utah Laws, Ch. 100 (continued)

Sec. 53. Securement of compensation—insurance associations subject

to rules. Employers, but not including municipal bodies, shall secure
compensation to their employes in one of the following ways:
(1) By insuring and keeping insured the payment of such compensation with the State insurance fund, or
* (2) By insuring and keeping insured the payment of such compensation with any stock corporation or mutual association authorized
to transact the business of workmen's compensation insurance in the
State, or
•(3) By furnishing to the commission satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct the compensation in the amount and manner
and when due as provided for in this Act, In the latter case the
commission may in its discretion require the deposit of acceptable
security, indemnity, or bond to secure the payment of compensation
liabilities as they are incurred.
I

All stock corporations or mutual associations transacting the business of workmen's compensation insurance in this State under the
terms of subdivision (2) of this section shall be subject to the rules
and regulations of the commission with respect to rata* t* h* ch*™**
and methods of compensation to be used.

1917 Utah Laws,... ( li. 100

(continued)

Section 71. Right to recovery under this Act exclusive lemedy—exccj>*
tions. The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions
of this Act for injuries sustained by an employe shall he the exclusive
remedy against the employer, except that where the injury is caused by
the employer's wilful misconduct and such act causing such injury is
the personal act of the employer himself, or if the employer he a partnership, on the part of one of the partners, or if a corporation, on the
part pf an elective officer or officers thereof, and such act indicates
a wilful disregard of the life, limb or bodily safety of employes, such
injured employe may, at his option, either claim compensation under
this Act or maintain an action at law for damages. The term "wilful
misconduct," as employed in this section shall be construed to mean
an act done knowingly and purposely with the direct object of injuring
another.
3ec^ 72. Election as to remedy—assignment of ««iuse--<ompfomise.

If an employe entitled ^o compensation under this Act be injured or }
killed by the negligence ojr wrong of another not in the same employ,,
such injured employe, or in case of death, his dependents, shall, be- (
fore any suit or claim under this*Act, elect whether to take compensation under this Act or to pursue his remedy against such other. Such
election shall be evidenced in such manner as the commission may by
rule or regulation prescribe. If he elect to take compensation under
this Act, the cause of action against such other shall be assigned to the
State for the benefit of the State insurance fund, if compensation be
payable therefrom, and otherwise to the person or association or corporation liable for the payment of such compensation, and if he elect
to proceed against such other, the State insurance fund, person or
association or corporation, as the case may be, shall contribute only
the deficiency, if any, between the amount of the recovery against
such other person actually collected, and the compensation provided
or estimated by this Act for such case. Such a cause of action assigned
to the State may be prosecuted or compromised by the commission.
A compromise of any such cause of action by the employe or his
dependents at an amount less than the compensation provided for by
this Act, shall be made only with the written approval of the commission, if the deficiency of compensation would be payable from the"
State insurance fund, and otherwise with the written approval of the^
person, association or corporation liable to pay the same.
-J*?

1919 Utah Laws. Ch. 63

3110. Employers subject to provisions--terms used. The following
all constitute employers subject to Hie provisions of this lUlf •
(1) The State, and each county, city, town and school di iiict
[therein
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, including every
lie utility, that has in service three or more workmen or operatives
.ularly employed in the same business, or in or about the same esIliahment. under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or
written, except agricultural laborers and domestic servants; provictedjl
that employeis who have in service less than three employees and emJfi
ploycrs of agricultural laborers and domestic servants shall have tliei
right to come under the terms of this title by complying with the pro*
visions thereof and all rules and regulations of the Commission,
The term M regularly,M as herein used, shall include all employ--.
meats, whether continuous throughout the year or for only a portionof the year. It means all employments in the usual course of the"
trade, business, profession or occupation of an employer.
Where any employer procures any work to.be done wholly or inpart for him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision"**
or control, and the work so procured to be done is a part or process ••
in the trade or business of said employer, then such contractor and all^
persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, and all^
persons employed by any such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within^
the meaning of this Section, employees.of such original employer. Anyjg
person, firm or .corporation engaged in the performance of work a y
an independent contractor, shall be deemed an employer within thfl
meaning of this Section. The words "independent contractor," as \
herein used, is defined to be any person, association or corporation .
engaged in the performance of any work for another, and while so
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that pertains to the|execution of the work is not subject to the rule or control of the em-rployer, is engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece^
of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result
in accordance with the employer's de^i^n.
*

35-1-19. Investigation of places of employment--Violations of rules or
orders—Temporary injunction.—-Upon complaint by any person that any
employment or place of employment, regardless of the number of persons
employed, is not safe or is injurious to the welfare of any employee, the
commission shall proceed, with or without notice, to make such investigation
as may be necessary to determine the matter complained of. After such
investigation the commission shall enter such order relative thereto as
may be necessary to render such employment or place of employment
safe and not injurious to the welfare of the employees therein. Whenever
the commission shall believe that any employment or place of employment
is not safe or is injurious to the welfare of any employee it may, of its own
motion, summarily investigate the same, with or without notice, and issue
such order as it may deem necessary to render Mich employment or place of
employment safe.
Notwithstanding any other penalty provided in this title, if any employer, after receiving notice, fails or refuses to obey the rules, regulations,
or order of the commission relative to the protection of the life, health,
safety and/or welfare of any employee the district court of Utah, is
empowered, upon petition of the commission to issue, ex parte and without
bond, a temporary injunction restraining the further operation of Hie
employer's business.

35-1-39, Violation of judgments, orders, decrees or provisions of act—
i Grade of offense.—If any employer, employee or other person violates any
provision of this title, or does any act prohibited hereby, or fails or refuses
to perform any duty lawfully imposed, or fails, neglects or refuses to obey
any lawful order given or made by the commission, or any judgment or decree made by any court in connection with the provisions of this title,
such employer, employee or other person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

354-42. E m pi 0 y er g enumerated m^ €|e^lle<j—Regularly employed -Independent contractors.—The following shall constitute employers subject
to the provisions of this title:
(1) The state, and each county, city, town and school district tfitiein.
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, including every public utility, haung in service one or more workmen or operatives regularly
employed in the same business, or in or about the same establishment,
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except
agricultural laborers and domestic servants; provided, that employers
of agricultural laborers and domestic servants, shall have the right to come
under the terms of this title by complying with the provisions thereof and
the rules and regulations of the commission
The term "regularly" as herein used shall include all employ mints in
the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer, whether continuous throughout the y» ar or for only a portion of
the year.
Where anj employer procures any work to be dime wholl> or in part
for hi in by a contractor o\tr whose work lie retains supervision or control, and such work Is a part or process in the trade or business of the
employer, such contractor, and all persons employed by him, and all
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any such sub< ontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees
of such original employer. Any person, firm or corporation engaged in
the performance of work as an independent contractor shall be deemed
an employer within the meaning of this section. The term "independent
contractor," as herein used, is defined to be any person, association or
corporation engaged in the performance of any work for another, who,
of the commission. All such penalties when collated shall be paid into
the combined injury benefit fund.

3I> 1 46.
Employers
Lo
snuie
i omp< \\ itiluu HajH
al!owed-Failure-Notice~In junction Violation I IIH I I y.-Employers including counties, cities, towns and school
districts shall secure compensation to their employees
in one of the following ways:
(1) By insuring, and keeping insured, the pa>ment
of such compensation with the state insurance fund which
payment shall commence within 90 days of any final award
of the commission.
(2) By insuring, and >e<pJng insujod, the payment
of such compensation with any stock corporation or mutual
association authorized to transact the business of workmen's compensation insurance In this state which payment
shall commence within 90 days of any final award of
the i ommission.
(3) By furnishing annually lo the commission satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct compensation in the amount, in the manner and when due as provided
for in this title which payment shall commence within
90 days of any final award of the commission. In such
cases the commission may in its discretion require the
deposit of acceptable security, indemnity or bond to
secure the payment of compensation liabilities as they
are incurred, and may at any time change or modify its
findings of fact herein provided for, if in its judgment
such action is necessary or desirable to secure or assure
a strict compliance with all the provisions of law
relating to the payment of compensation and the furnishing
of medical, nurse and hospital services, laedicines and
burial expenses to injured, and to the hospital services,
medicines and burial expenses to injured, and to the
dependents of killed employees.
The commission may
in proper cases revoke any employer's privilege a1 a
self-insurer.
The commission is hereby authorized and empowered
to maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin
any employer, within the provisions of this act, from
further operation of the employer's business, where
the employer has failed to injure or to keep insured
in one of the three ways in this section provided, the
payment of compensation to injured employees, and upon
a showing of such failure to insure the court shall
enjoin the further operation of su< h business until
such time as such insurance has bei n obtained by the
employer.
The court may enjoin the employer without
requiring bond from the commission.
If the commission has reason to believe that an
employer of one or more employees is conducting a business
without securing the payment of compensation in one
of the three ways provided in this section, the commission

35-1 -46 ((on! 1nued)

may give such employer five days* written notice by
registered mail of such noncompliance and if the employer
within said period does not remedy such default, the
commission may file suit as in this section above provided
and the court is empowered, ex parte to issue without
bond a temporary injunction restraining the further
operation of the employer's business.
The commission is hereby authorized <uid ompow*red
to maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin
any employer, within the provisions of this act, from
further operation of the employer's business, win re
the employer has failed to insure or to keep i tr u i IM1
in one of the three ways in this section provided, the
payment of compensation to injured employees, and upon
a showing of such failure to insure the court shall
enjoin the fui tlior operation of such business until
such time as such insurance has been obtained by the
employer.
The court may enjoin the employer without
requiring bond from the commission.
If the commission has reason lu believe Hat an
employer of one or more employees is conducting a business
without securing the payment of compensation in one
of the three ways provided in this section, the commission
nay give such employer five days' written notice by
registered mail of such noncompliance and if the employer
within said period does not remedy such default, the
commission may file suit as in this section above provided
and the court is empowered, ex parte to issue without
bond a temporary injunction restraining the fuitrcr
operation of the employer's business.
Any employer who shall fail to comply with the
provisions of section 35-1-46 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon complaint of the commission and conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less
than $10 nor more than $100 or by imprisonment in the
county jail for not less than thirty days nor more than
six months or by other such fine and imprisonment
Fsch
days' failure shall be a separate offense.
All funis
so collected shall be deposited in the special fund
as described in section 35-1-68 and used for the purposes
in this title provided.

35-1-57. Noncompliance—Penalty.—Employers who shall fail to comply
with the provisions of section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the benefits of
this title during the period of noncompliance, but shall be liable in a civil
action to their employees for damages suffered by reason of personal injuries arising out of or in the course of employment caused by the wrongful
act, neglect or default of the employer or any of the employer's officers,
agents or employees, and also to the dependents or personal representatives
of such employees where death results from such injuries. In any such action the defendant shall not avail himself of any of the following defenses:
the defense of the fellow-servant rule, the defense of assumption of risk,
or the defense of contributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall constitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the employer and
the burden shall be upon the employer to show freedom from negligence resulting in such injury. And such employers shall also be subject to the
provisions of the two sections next succeeding [35-1-58, 35-1-59]. In any
civil action permitted under this section against the employer the employee
shall be entitled to necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fee assessed
against the employer.

35-1-58. Eights of employees where employer fails to comply.—Any
employee, whose employer has failed to comply with the .provisions of section 35-1-46, who has been injured by accident arising out of or m the
course of his employment, wheresoever such injury occurred, if the same
was not purposely self-inflicted, or his dependents in case death has ensued, may, in lieu of proceeding against his employer by civil action in
the courts as provided in the last preceding section [35-1-57], file his application with the commission for compensation in accordance with the terms
of this title, and the commission shall hear and determine such application
for compensation as in other cases; and the amount of compensation which
the commission may ascertain and determine to be due to such injured
employee, or his dependents in case death has ensued, shall be paid by
such employer to the persons entitled thereto within ten days after receiving notice of the amount thereof as so fised and determined by the
commission.

354-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, agent or employee—Occupational disease excepted.—The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy
against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer,
agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil liability
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, n^xt of kin, heirs, pergonal
representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of
any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or
arising out of his employment, and no action at law may be maintained
against an employer or against any officer, agent or employee of the
employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee.
Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for
compensation in those cases within the provisions of the Utah Occupational
Disease Disability Act, as amended.

(PRE-1P75)

35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of third partiesRemedies of employee—Rights of employer or insurance carrier in cause of
action—Maintenance of action—Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.—
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under
this title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another
person not in the same employment, the injured employee, or in case of
death his dependents, may claim compensation and the injured employee
or his heirs or personal representative may also have an action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to ]j>ay compensation, the
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either
in its own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or
the personal representative of the deceased, provided the employer or
carrier may not settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission.
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees,
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear. No attorneys' fee chargeable to the carrier or employer under this section shall exceed 15% of the compensation either one
may be obligated to pay. Such fee is to be a credit upon any fee payable
by the injured employee or, in the case of death, by the dependents, for
any recovery had against the third party. Before proceeding against the
third party, the injured employee, or, in case of death, his heirs, shall give
written notice of such intention to the carrier or olther person obligated
for the compensation payments, in order to give such person a reasonable
opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys' fees provided for in subsection (1).
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation.

(POST-1975)

35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of employer or
insurance carrier in cause of action — Maintenance of action — Notice of intention to proceed
against third party — Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer relationship —
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission.
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of section 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as
follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees,
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third
party.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys' fees provided for in subsection (1).
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for corrmensation

